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COMFORT V. COMFORT.

[17 C. (2d)'

is uncontradicted there has never been such an unreasonable
lapse of time as will cause the presumption to arise.
[9] "Respondent husband contends that such a doctrine
will forever bar him from securing a divorce because of his misdeeds of 1924. That may be true. The doctrine of recrimination is based on the concept that he who seeks redress for
the violation of a contract resting upon mutual and dependent
covenants must himself have performed the obligations on his
part. (9 Cal. Jur., p. 689, sec. 58.) It is part of the general
equity doctrine that he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands. The legislature has seen fit to make the
doctrine an integral part of the law of this state. It is not
for the courts to determine the rightness or wrongness of
the doctrine so declared. That is a legislative and not a judicial 'function.
"While it is true, as already pointed out in this opinion,
that under some limited circumstances a husband may secure
a divorce for acts occurring after his wife has secured a separate maintenance decree, those circumstances do not exist in
the instant case. In Cardinale v. Oardinale, 8 Cal. (2d) 762
[68 Pac. (2d) 351], there was evidence from which the trial
court could reasonably infer not only a condonation, but also
that the parties had actually resumed marital relations after
the wife secured the separate maintenance decree. In every
case cited by respondent there was either direct evidence or
evidence from which an inference could be drawn that, after
the wife secured her decree, there was either a reconciliation
or a bona fide attempt to effect one. There is no such evidence in the instant case. Under such circumstances it must
be held that, as a matter of law, the appellant has established
a recriminatory defense." . . .
In view of this conclusion we do not find it necessary, not
would it serve any useful purpose, to review the sufficiency
of the evidence in respect to cruelty found to have been inflicted by the wife. ,
The judgment appealed from is reversed.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 15,
1941.
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[So F. No. 16548. In Bank.-Apri118, 1941.J

CLARENCE G. FRY, Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
et aI., Appellants.
WALLACE B. BEEBE, Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO etal., Appellants.
[1] Schools~Teachers-Oontracts of Employment and Oompensa.tion-Salaries-Rules and Resolutions.-Rules and regulations
of school boards pertaining to teachers' salaries are governed
by the principle of uniformity of treatment as to salary for
those performing like services with like experience; but the
making of reasonable classifications is not prevented.
[2] Id.-Teachers-Oontracts of Employment and Oompensa.tion
-Salaries ~ Salary Ratings-Incoming Teachers.-A school
board has authority to adopt a resolution that no o,utside experience will be credited in fixing salary ratings for incoming
teachers, where such resolution applies to all incoming
teachers.
[3] Id.-Teachers-Contracts of Employment and CompensationSalaries-Rules and Resolutions-Applicatioil to Teachers Absent on Leave.-A school board resolution that in fixing salary
ratings for incoming teachers "outside experience will not be
credited," does not apply to teachers who had been employed but were at the time of its adoption absent on leave.
[4] Id.-Teachers-Contracts of Employment and CompensationSalaries-Rules and Resolutions-Explanatory Olause.-In a
school board resolution against crediting outside experience in
setting salary ratings for "incoming teachers", an explanatory
clause that it applies also to persons on eligible lists not
appointed to positions to date, shows that the resolution was
not intended to apply to teachers who had been employed
and assigned to schools but were absent on leave.
[5] Id. ~ Teachers - General Considerations-Status.-A teacher
employed but on leave of absence is nevertheless an employee
of the board.
L See 23 CaI. Jur. 126.
McK. Dig. References: 1-4. Schools, § 92; 5. SchoolS, § 81; 6.
Schools, § 88j 7. Schools, § 92j 8. Equity, § 37 (3) j 9. Mandamus,
§74.
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[6] Id.-Teachers-Contracts of :employment and OompensationIn General-Where Contract Found.-The terms of a contrMt
employing a teacher are to be found in the authority granted
the school board by law, the contract being contained in the
statutes,the rules and regulations of the board, the resolution
appointing the teMher, and the r~solutions of the board.
[7] Id.-Teachers-Contracts of Employment and Oompensation':"'"
Salaries-Acceptance of Lower Rating.-A teacher's right to
a· particular salary rating is not affected by his acceptance of
a lower rating in accordance with an erroneous interpretation
of a resolution of the school board by a director of personnel.
[8] Equity-Laches-Nature and Elements-Prejudice.-Lapse. of
time short of the period provided by the statute of limitations
will not bar an action unless prejudic\'l to the defendant re~
suIted. Whether a party acted seasonably, and whether the
opposite party was prejudiced by the delay are questions of
fact.
[9] Mandamus---'-Defenses-Statute of Limitations.-In a mandamus proceeding by' a teacher to obtain a reciassification of
teachers at a higher salary rating and to compel payment of
back salary at the higher rate, an award of back salary for a
period of. three years. prior to the action is for the minimum
period that the court could have awarded.

APPEAL from judgments of the ,Superior Court of the
City' and County of San Francisco..' C~ J. Goodell, Judge.
Affirmed.
John J. O'Toole, City Attorney, Walter A. Dold, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, and Irving G. Breyer for Appellants.
Daniel R. Shoemaker for Respondent.
THE CO~T.-A petition, for 'hearing in this case was
granted to the end that further consideration be given to
the contentions of the appellants. On such consideration,
we agree with the disposition of the appeal by the District
Court of Appeal of the First Appellate District, Division
One, and adopt as the opinion of this court the opinion of
that court. prepared by Presiding Justice Peters. It is as
follows:
"The defendants, the Board of Education and its mem~ers, and the Superintendent of Schools of the City and
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County of San Francisco, appeal from jud~ents of the trial
court in two mandamus proceedings ordering, defendants to
classify and rate the two plaintiffs, both high school teachers,
at a rating and salary in excess of that granted them by
defendants, and awarding both plaintiffs back salary for a ;
designated period at the higher rating. The two cases were
tried together, and have been consolidated on appeal.
"The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs Fry and Beebe
were appointed high school teachers in the San Francisco
school department on November 3, 1931, and January4, 1932,
respectively, each being given at that time, in accordance with
the then existing rules and regulations of the school department, an advanced rating predicated upon previous teaching
experience outside the City and County of San Francisco.
Not only were plaintiffs so appointed and rated, but, at
that time, they were assigned to particularly designated
schools. At the time of their appointment, at their request,
they were granted leaves of absence to the end of that school
year-June of 1932. The salary schedule then applicable to
plaintiffs was one that had been duly adopted by the Board of
, Education, and which is still in' effect. This salary schedule
provides for an increase of salary, dependent upon years of
service. 'After the leaves of absence were granted, substitutes
were appOinted to teach in the place of plaintiffs for the
balance of that school year.
"While plaintiffs were on their respective leaves ofabsence, but while they were in the employ of defendants, the
Board,on February 16, 1932, adopted the following resolution:
" 'RESOLVED: That the Personnel Department be and is '
hereby advised that it is the policy of the Board of Education, at present, that in setting salary ratings for incoming
teachers, no outside eiperiencewill be crl;ldited. (This regulation also applies to persons on existing eligible lists not
appointed to positions in the San Francisco Public Schools to
date.) ,
"On February 24, 1932, the plaintiffs were informed by
letter from the Assistant Director of Personnel of the school
department, Mr. IrvIng W. Snow, that the resolution had been
passed, and that it applied to them, and asking the .plaintiffs whether they wanted an assignment on· those terms.
Both plaintiffs replied that they would accept employment

!",
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at the reduced salary,but expressed the hope there would be
an adjustment.
.
(i On May 4, 1932, both plaintiffs were notified in writing
that, effective at the end of that school year, they were discharged from the school department, and they were notified
that they would be pla<led on the eligible list. On August 9,
1933, effective on the 14th of that month,bothplainti:/Is were
again appointed to positions in the school department without credit for their. outside experience.
"At the time that plaintiffs were first appointed in 1931,
four other teachers were also appointed and assigned to
positions in the school department. These four teachers, like
Fry and Beebe, had no teaching experience in San Francisco,
but, like them, were given an advanced rating for outside
teaching. experience. Unlike Fry and Beebe theSe four
teachers did not take leaves of absence but taught from the
date of their respective appointments until June 30, 1932.
These four teachers, just as were plaintiffs, were dismissed
in May of 1932. They were likewise re-appointed at the
same time as were plaintiffs. These four teachers, however,
were not re-employed at a first year'8 salary rating as were
plaintiffs, but were given an advanced rating predicated upon
their outside experience. For all practical purposes theonly
difference between these four teachers and the plaintiffs is
that they taught in San Francisco during the period the
plaintiffs, although appointed and assigned, were on leaves of
absence.
"After the appointment of these four teachers some question arose as to whether, under the resolution of February
16, 1932, they were entitled to the advanced rating· predicated solely on outside experience. On August 29, 1934,
the Board adopted a resolution interpreting its former resolution. This so-called 'interpretation' was adopted to determine whether these four teachers were legally entitled to
advanced ratings. It stated that the resolution 'was not intended to cover, and did not refer to teachers who were
already in the Department, and who had been given a rating
as in the case of the teachers above mentioned; but applied
to incoming teachers'.
"The trial court found, on competent evidence, that plain~
tiffs, ever since their respective re-appointments, continu~
ously and by diligent means, have endeavored to be restored
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to their original ratings and to be p+aced in the same classification as the four teachers above-mentioned.
(, Based on these admitted facts, the trial. court found that
plaintiffs were entitled 'under the rules and regulations of
respondents then in full force and effect', to be classified at _
the advanced rating, The .court also concluded that the
failure of defendants to so classify plaintiffs 'was arbitrary
and unreasonable and that said conduct violated the rule of
uniformity'.
"Based on these findings l the trial court ordered defendants to classify plaintiffs at the advanced ratings, and gave
judgment for plaintiffs for back salary for a period of three
years prior to the commencement of these proceedings.
(( Defendants discuss at some length the question as to
whether the Board could have legally classified the plaintiffs
differently from the four teachers who actually -taught' in the
San Francisco schools after their first appointment. That
is not the real issue in these cases. The real issue is whether
the Board did so classify the plaintiffs. In other words, the
real issue is whether, under the rules and regulations of the
Board, the plaintiffs were entitled to an advanced rating.
The arbitrary action of the Board, as found by the trial court,
did not consist in classifying plaintiffs in a different group
from the other four teachers, but in interpreting their rules,
regulations and resolutions so as to place plaintiffs in a
different classification. It is our conclusion that the Board
was not justified in refusing to grant to plaintiffs an advanced rating; that under the resolution of February 16,
1932, its interpretation of August 29, 1934, and the rules
and regulations of the Board, plaintiffs were legally entitled
to the advanced rating.
"It inust he conceded that, within the limits fixed by the
School Oode, the Board has discretionary control over· the
salaries of teachers. (Fidler v. Board of Trustees, 112 Cal.
App. 296 [296 Pac. 912] ; .Abrciham v.Sims, 2 Cal. (2d) 698
[42 Pac. (2d) 1029].) [1] However, it must also be conceded that the legislature had enjoined on such Boards, within
reasonable limits, the principle of uniformity of treatment
as to salary for those performing like services with like
experience. This same limitation exists in the rules and regulations of the appellant Board. This limitation, however,
does not prevent the Board from making reasonable ('la.ssifica.-

758

FRY

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION.

[17 C. (2d)

tions. There can be no doubt that the Board may reasonably
classify between teachers with teaching experience in San
Francisco and those with teaching experience outside. [2]
There can be no doubt that the resolution of February 16,
1932, was well within the power of the Board in so far as it
provided that as to all incoming teachers no credit for outside experience should be granted. It might also be conceded
that the Board could, by proper action, classify as between
absence, and teachers
teachers employed,' but on leave
employed and actually teaching. 'It may be that the Board
could have lawfully class.ified the four teachers who had
actually taught in San Francisco prior to June of 1932,
in one group, and could lawfully have placed the plaintiffs,
who were similarly employed but who were on leaves of absence, in another group. But, as already pointed out, the
point is that the Board did not do this. It is our opinion
that, under this resolution, and the rules and regulations of
the Board, both groups were placed in the same classification.
Thereafter, by a purported interpretation of the resolution
by the Assistant Director of Personnel, the Board, without
changing its resolutions, sought to discriminate against plaintiffs, and arbitrarily refused to grant to plaintiffs the salary
rating fixed for them by the rules and regulations.
[3] "The resolution of February 16, 1932, is not ambiguous on the basic question here involved. The resolution states
that it is to apply only to 'incoming teachers', and that as
to them, and as to them alone, 'no outside experience will
be credited'. Then, apparently, so that no confusion would
result, it was added in parenthesis that the regulation applies
to persons on the eligible lists 'not appointed to positions in
the San Francisco Public Schools to date'. Obviously, the
plaintiffs were not 'incoming teachers', because at the time
the resolution was passed they were in the employ of the
Board. If they became' incoming teachers' by virtue of their
subsequent dismissal and their later re-employment, so did
the· four other teachers who were likewise subsequently dismissed and later re-employed. There is not one word in the
resolution indicating that it was intended to apply to teachers
who had been employed but were on leave of absence. To
interpret the resolution as do defendants, is to write'into the
resolution something that is not there. That this interpreta~
tion of the resolution is the proper one, is strengthened, i1
not conclusively demonstrated, by three other factors!

ox
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[4] "1. The explanatory clause added to the resolution
states that the resolution not only applies to 'incoming
teachers', but also 'to persons on existing eligible lists not
appointed to positions in the San Francisco Public Schools to
date'. In this case the record shows, and the trial court
found, that not only had plaintiffs been appointed, but also
that they had been assigned to particularly designated schools
at the time the resolution was passed. The explanatory
clause definitely eliminates plaintiffs from the operation of
the resolution. (5] A teacher employed but on leave of
absence is, nevertheless, an employee of the Board. (Fairchild v. Board of Edtwation, 107 Cal. 92 [40 Pac. 26]; Kennedy v. Board of Educatian, 82 Cal. 483 [22 Pac. 1042].)
It has been held that in determining a teacher's seniority
rights, the relation of employer and employee continues to
exist although the teacher is on leave of absence, and that a
teacher on leave of absence is within the terms of a resolu- .
tion retaining' the present staff of teachers'. (Ryan v"Burk,
25 Cal. App.(2d) 342 [77 Pac. (2d) 224].)
"2. After the resolution had been passed, and after pJaintiffs and the other four teachers had been re-employed, the
Board, on August 29, 1934, attempted to 'interpret' the
resolution. At that time the Board approved the interpretation of the chairman of the legal committee that the resolution 'was not intended to cover, and did not refer to teachers
who were already in the Department, and who had been
given a rating as in the case of the teachers above mentioned; but applied to incoming teachers'. The' teachers
'above mentioned' were the four teachers who were. appointed
at the same time as respondents. This interpretation was
undoubtedly correct. But, in applying it, the Board discriminated against plaintiffs, who, so far as the resolution
is concerned, were placed in the same class with the four other
teachers.
"3. The legal adviser of the Board, in June of 1937, in a
formal opinion to the' Board dealing with this controversy,
gave it as his opinion that 'the facts as disclosed by the
records conclusively show that as a matter of equity and
justice, this teacher (Mr. Fry) has a valid claim. There
. appears to be no authority whatsoever·for. Mr. Snow's in.terpretation, of the. February 16, 1932, resolution, which he
. interpreted to mean that a· teacher who has been appointed
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to the Department on a definite rating based on creditable
outside experience and granted a leave of absence, was to
come within the purview of the February 16th resolution. To
so hold would be reading into that resolution something which
was not mentioned.
" 'There is no doubt that Mr. Fry was" appointed" to the
San Francisco School Department in November, 1931; that
the resolution of February 16, 1932, abolishing previous
teaching experience was expressly applicable to teachers not
as yet "appointed"; that teachers on leaves of absence were
already in the School Department. Therefore, Mr. Fry should
not have been reduced in his rating. . • . ' These conclusions of the legal adviser are sound.
"Defendants contend that the ordinary rules of contract
apply to a teacher, and that, since plaintiffs accepted their
reduced rating, they are barred from now questioning its
validity. [6] While it is true that the relation between the
Board and a teacher is that of employer and employee, and
that this relationship is created by contract, the terms of that
contract are to be found in the authority granted the Board
by law. (Martin v. Fisher, 108 Cal. App. 34 [291 Pac. 276].)
The rules and regulations of the Board, and the resolutions of
the Board fixing the status of teachers,are integral parts of
that contract. The contract is contained in the statutes, the
rules and regulations of the board, the resolutions appointing
plaintiffs,and the resolutions of the Board. Certainly, it
cannot be contended that the Board can fix the status of a
teacher by its rules and regulations, and by resolution, and
then by a letter from an employee improperly interpreting
the resolutions, claim that the status is different from that
fixed by the rules and regulations and by the resolution. In
this case, when plaintiffs were first employed, they were properly given advanced ratings. It is admitted that, under the
then existing rules and regulations, plaintiffs were lawfully
entitled to such ratings. If we are correct in our conclusion that the resolutions of February 16, 1932, and of
August 29, 1934, did not apply to plaintiffs, then it must
be a fact, as found by the trial court, that, under existing
rules and regulations; plaintiffs were entitled to the advanced
ratings. These rules and regulations constitute, and are
part of, the contract of the parties, and under them plaintiffs
were entitled to the advanced ratIngs.
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[7] "The fact that Snow, the Assistant Director of Personnel, erroneously informed plaintiffs that the resolution
of February 16, 1932, applied to them, and that plaintiffs
stated that, if that were necessary, they would accept the
lower ratings, cannot serve to change the terms of the contracts of the parties as fixed by the rules and regUlations.
Snow erroneously interpreted the resolution, informed plaintiffs of his erroneous conclusion, and on that basis the plaintiffs' accepted' the reduction. Their rights were fixed not by
that correspondence but by the rules and regulations of the
Board.
[8] "Defendants also urge that plaintiffs' claims for
back salary are barred by laches, and by the statute of limitations. The trial court awarded plaintiffs back salary for three
years prior to October 29, 1937, the date this proceeding was
instituted. So far as laches is concerned, the question must
be determined by all the facts and circumstances of each
case. Lapse of time short of the period provided by the
statute of limitations will not bar an action unless prejudice
to the defendant is shown. The applicable principles are
exhaustively considered, and the cases cited by defendants
are distinguished, in La Shells v. Hench, 98 Cal. App. 6
[276 Pac. 377J. Whether plaintiffs acted seasonably, and
.whether defendants were prejudiced by such a delay, were
questions of fact for the trial court. The record shows that
prior to the commencement of these actions the matter was
under discussion, and that it was hoped by all concerned that
a compromise could be effected. It was after all hope of a
compromise had failed that these actions were brought.
[9] "It is also urged that plaintiffs' causes of action were
barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court awarded
plaintiffs back salary at the advanced ratings for a period of
three years prior to the commencement of the actions, and
held that the balance of their claim was barred. This was
the minimum period that the court could have awarded.
(Rosborough v. Shasta River Canal Co., 22 Cal. 556; Raymond
v. Ohristian, 24 Cal. App. (2d) 92 [74 Pac. (2d) 536J.) "
For the foregoing reasons the judgments appealed from
are affirmed.
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